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Introduction
Under an emissions trading system (also known as cap-and-trade), producers must acquire permits equal to the amount of their emissions in a given period. These permits are then remitted to the issuing institution. 1 So far, the results from actual implementations of emissions trading have been mixed, and some policy-makers have argued that taxes would be more e¤ective in reducing emissions. Similar criticisms have also appeared in related academic investigations. In a highly publicized recent study, Clï¿oe and Vendramin (2012) criticized certain features of the ETS that have led to low prices for permits. They point out shortcomings, speci…cally in regard to the ability of emissions trading to induce investment in new technologies. They instead advocate a tax as a more e¤ective non-distortionary instrument leading to price stability and increased clean investments.
Our work takes a di¤erent path from the existing literature. It is motivated by the observation that emission-trading mechanisms resemble monetary mechanisms in at least two ways. First, both attempt to implement desirable allocations under various frictions, including risk and private information. Second, in both cases implementation relies on the issue and trading of objects whose value is at least partially determined by expectations, namely (…at) money and permits, respectively. 2 Our model is built around the assumption that individual …rms have some private information about their need to engage in high emission-intensity activities. As …rms are heterogenous regarding their emission-intensity needs, they must be provided with the appropriate incentives in order to e¢ ciently adjust their production levels. We use insights from dynamic mechanism design in monetary economics to derive properties of optimal dynamic emissions trading mechanisms. 3 We …nd that a state-contingent tax system can do at least as well as a cap-and-trade system in most cases, and it can dominate it when there is endogenous clean technology adoption. More generally, we argue that policy-makers should think about permit-issue in a manner similar to that used by central bankers. We discuss the determination of the optimal permit-issue policy and …nd that, at the optimum, the price of permits must increase over time. In the absence of aggregate risk, there is no role for "banking;"i.e., the optimum can be supported even if the permits expire at the end of the speci…ed period of time. When …rms can choose the level of technological progress in clean technologies, emissions trading might not be able to implement the e¢ cient allocation. This is because, if there is a high fraction of "dirty …rms"in the economy, emissions trading either makes technology adoption by these …rms too slow, or it must distort production levels relative to the …rst best. Interestingly, we demonstrate that …scal policies do not su¤er from this drawback. 4 In an in ‡uential paper, Weitzman (1974) studied price versus quantity-targeting policies in the presence of uncertainty and concluded that their e¤ectiveness depends on the relative elasticities of 1 One of the …rst such systems was established in the US in 1990 trough the Clean Air Act in order to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. As a follow-up to the Kyoto protocol, EU countries adopted the so called EU Emission Trading System (ETS) in 2005 in connection to a reduction in carbon emissions. 2 Of course, a "central permit issuer," an authority similar to a central bank, is not yet in existence. One implication of our analysis is to point out the need for such an authority to be established. 3 For related applications of dynamic mechanism design to optimal taxation and to monetary theory see, for example, Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003) and Wallace (2012) . 4 La¤ont and Tirole (1996) derive a similar result where markets fail to deliver the e¢ cient outcome in a twoperiod model where pollution innovation is endogenous. supply and demand. However, Weitzman did not consider state-contingent policies. In our model, state-contingent taxes are an important tool towards implementing e¢ cient levels of output and emissions. Requate (2005) surveys the large existing literature on instrument choice and innovation in abatement technologies. The similarity between emissions permits and money is mentioned in Lackner, Wilson, and Ziock (2001) . However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst paper that explores the implications of formalizing this insight. Blyth, Bradley, Bunn, Clarke, Wilson, and Yang (2007) investigate how environmental policy uncertainty a¤ects investment in low-emission technologies in the power-generation sector. In their model, …rms can choose from di¤erent irreversible investments. They …nd that price uncertainty decreases clean investments. Li and Shi (2010) use a static general equilibrium model to compare regulatory emission standards and emission taxes as alternative tools for controlling emissions in a monopolistically competitive industry with heterogenous …rms. They …nd that an emissions standard results in higher welfare than taxes if and only if productivity dispersion among …rms is small and dirty …rms enjoy a high degree of monopoly power. Brunner, Flachsland, and Marschinski (2011) discuss dynamic aspects of emissions trading, including issues related to credibility. Chen and Tseng (2011) …nd that investment can be used to hedge against price risk, and it increases with uncertainty. In all these models the price of permits is treated as exogenous. Colla, Germain, and Van Steenberghe (2012) endogenize the price of the permits and study optimal policy in the presence of speculators. The connection between environmental policy and business cycles is discussed in Heutel (2012) . Finally, in a recent working paper, Albrizio and Silva (2012) introduce uncertainty over the exogenous policy rule, as well as the possibility of reversible and irreversible investments by …rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model, while Section 3 studies taxation and emissions trading in a model with technological change. A brief conclusion follows. Technical material and an extension to include a futures market can be found in the Appendix.
The Model
Time is denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::. The economy is populated by a [0; 1]-continuum of …rms and a [0; 1]-continuum of workers. Firms and workers discount the future at a rate 2 (0; 1). There are two goods: labor and a (numeraire) consumption good. Each …rm produces the numeraire good using labor. Workers supply labor to the …rms and consume the numeraire good. Using q units of labor, each …rm can produce f (q) units of the numeraire good. We assume that f is a smooth, strictly increasing, and strictly concave function. Production is costly for the society, as each operating …rm creates harmful emissions. When the level of overall emissions is E, the utility of workers from consuming c units of the numeraire good and working q hours is U (c; q; E) = u (c) q E. 5 For simplicity, we assume that there is no storage across periods. We think of the emission-intensity of a …rm's operations as being subject to random shocks. For example, these shocks may represent the need to use energy for transportation, or for cooling or heating due to weather conditions, which are inherently random. More precisely, we assume that in each period, each …rm receives a shock, , which determines the degree of emissions generated by its production activity. At time t, the amount of emissions generated by a …rm that received shock and that uses q units of labor is given by f (q). For simplicity, we assume that the 's are iid across time and across …rms. We denote the cumulative distribution of by G ( ), and we assume that its support is the interval 0; . 6 In order to capture the fact that …rms have more information than the regulating authority about their need to use high emission-intensity, we assume that these shocks are private information. This is a relevant and novel feature of our analysis, as it implies that e¢ cient policies need to "elicit information" about the realization of these shocks.
Throughout the paper, we study conditions under which the full-information …rst-best allocation, hence forth called the "e¢ cient allocation,"is supportable. Thus, we will follow the following steps. First, we will characterize the full-information …rst-best arrangement under certain assumptions on the underlying economic environment. Then we investigate under what conditions various policies, such as taxation or trading in permits, can support the …rst-best. Of course, in order to be consistent with the private information friction, the policies themselves are not permitted to depend on the true value of the 's. 7 While all producing …rms create pollution, they can also reduce their emissions at some cost. More precisely, given , we assume that each …rm can reduce its e¤ective emissions to an amount y by incurring the cost h ( q y), where h ( ) is the same convex function for all …rms, with h (0) = 0 and h 0 (0) = 0. We …rst study the economy in the absence of any policy. In this case, …rms maximize their pro…ts without being concerned about their emissions. Since …rms only di¤er in their degree of emissions, in this case they behave homogeneously and maximize their periodby-period pro…ts. Thus, …rms in each period t hire q units of labor at market wage w in order to solve = max
The optimal production satis…es f 0 (q) = w
and overall emissions, E, are given by E = q R dG ( ). Taking E as given, consumers maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint. Since the numeraire good is not storable and consumers are homogeneous, there is no scope for savings. Consumers solve:
where is the …rm's pro…t and E is the level of total emissions. The …rst order conditions imply wu 0 (c) = 1 (4) 6 We make these simplifying assumptions for tractability. Assuming that emissions are proportional to the amount of input employed by the …rm simpli…es the algebra, but the results would not change if emissions were assumed to be proportional to output. Introducing correlated shocks could allow us to investigate business cycle considerations as in Heutel (2012) . However, as is well known, dynamic models with private information and serially correlated shocks are not analytically tractable. This is an important avenue for future research. 7 When there is no aggregate risk, policies can depend on the aggregate .
Finally, market clearing gives
Combining (2) with (4) and (5) we obtain
We denote by q the scale of operation that solves (6) . Welfare, W , in this economy is then given by
Contrary to private …rms, a social planner must take emissions into account when solving for the e¢ cient outcome. It is easy to see that, since …rms vary in their degree of emissions, the …rst-best would induce di¤erent production levels across di¤erent …rms. The social planner solves the following problem.
We denote the e¢ cient production scale by q ( ) and the e¢ cient level of emissions by y ( ). The schedule (q ; y ) satis…es the following …rst order conditions for all :
where is the Lagrange multiplier on y q ( ), and 0 is the multiplier on y 0. In that case, consumption c is given by (8) .
Clearly, as h 0 (0) = 0, it is e¢ cient for all …rms to reduce emissions by a small amount and all active …rms must reduce their emissions at the optimum. Our assumptions also imply that, below a threshold factor, e¢ ciency requires that …rms reduce their emissions to zero; i.e., there exists ã > 0 such that y ( ) = 0, for all <~ . Above this threshold the optimal ex-post emissions are positive and proportional to the ex-ante emissions. The reason is simple. Our speci…cation implies that the marginal bene…t from reducing emissions is the same regardless of whether the reduction comes from a high-pollution or a low-polluting …rm. On the other hand, the cost of emissions reduction (in terms of consumption loss) is small if …rms are already relatively clean. This is true even if a …rm eliminates its emissions entirely, as h 0 ( q ( )) converges to zero when is small. The optimal total emissions level is given by E = R y ( ) dG ( ). Interestingly, the e¢ cient allocation dictates that some …rms reduce their emissions, by both reducing their production scale and by cleaning their act. Of course, in the absence of taxes or other emission control policies, all …rms operate at the same scale and none becomes cleaner.
For later reference, it is instructive to consider the following thought experiment. Consider two economies which are identical except that one is subject to a -distribution G 0 , while the other is subject to distribution G 1 , where
In words, …rms are on average cleaner in the economy under G 1 . The e¢ cient allocations in the two economies are such that~ 1 >~ 0 and, for all >~ 1 , we have q 1 ( ) < q 0 ( ) and y 1 ( ) < y 0 ( ).
Typically, e¢ ciency will require a reduction in emissions from their laissez-faire levels. One possible tool towards accomplishing this involves a tax. Another possibility involves imposing controls over emissions, together with operating a market for emissions permits, so that …rms which pollute most internalize the cost. We …rst consider an economy where …rms participate in a market for permits.
This market operates as follows. If a …rm produces q, and if its emission shock is , it will need to accumulate q emission permits. Alternatively, a …rm might invest in order to reduce its pollution to ex-post emission level y ( ) q and then accumulate y ( ) units of permits. The permits are remitted once production takes place. Permits can be traded. The (equilibrium) price of permits in terms of the numeraire is denoted by . The sequence of events for the producing …rms is as follows:
1. Receive shock and plan to produce q.
Reduce emissions to y ( )
q.
Produce and earn pro…t f (q) wq h ( q y ( )).
4. Adjust permits in the market and remit y ( ) permits.
5. Pro…ts, if any, are redistributed to shareholders.
Next period begins.
We assume that the total stock of emission permits in this economy is M , while a …rm's individual permit holdings are denoted by m. We proceed by de…ning the …rm's problem recursively. We denote the value function of a …rm entering the market with m permits and shock by V (m; ). This is de…ned by
where T is a transfer of permits by the issuing authority. 8 As we mentioned before, T cannot depend on the individual 's, as they are assumed to be private information. When a …rm enters the market for permits, the value of its portfolio is m. The …rm then has to remit y permits (with value y) and decides how many permits to carry over to the next period, m + . As a consequence, the …rm's pro…t changes by the amount (m y m + ). Given M , the market clearing conditions for permits and goods are
8 Note that T is not restricted in sign.
6
The law of motion for the stock of permits is
Given a policy fT t g, an equilibrium is a list of prices, f t g, a list of quantities and emissions, fc t ; q t ( ) ; y t ( )g, and trading decisions, fm t ( )g, such that, given prices, the decision variables solve the …rms' and the consumers' problems and markets clear. An equilibrium is stationary whenever the list of quantities and emissions is time independent; i.e., fc t ; q t ( ) ; y t ( )g = fc; q ( ) ; y ( )g, for all t. We …rst solve the …rm's problem. The …rst order conditions give
where ( ), 0 ( ) are the multipliers on the …rm's constraints. Notice that, as there is no persistence, all …rms will exit the market for permits with the same amount of permits for the next period. The envelope condition gives
Using this expression in (17) we obtain that E + , with equality if …rms carry permits from one period to the next. As + does not depend on , this gives us
In words, …rms are willing to "bank"permits, provided that their appropriately discounted future price equals today's spot price. If today's spot price is higher, then …rms prefer to buy their permits tomorrow, and no permits are held across periods. This will be the case if the issuing authority is supplying enough permits in the market tomorrow. However, there is no equilibrium if today's spot price is lower, as …rms will try to purchase an in…nite amount of permits today to resell in tomorrow's market. Like before, the worker's decision is given by (4) and, using market clearing, we obtain the following expression for the equilibrium wage.
To solve for y ( ), …rst notice that all …rms will reduce their ex-post emissions whenever permits are costly to acquire. In addition, the more costly permits, the more …rms choose not to pollute ex-post. The choice of production levels depends only on the realized marginal cost of emissions. It can be shown that q ( ; w) is decreasing in and in w, and that 0 ( ) > 0.
It is worth mentioning one e¤ect of general equilibrium analysis. The market solution for q ( ) does not necessarily coincide with the e¢ cient level, q ( ). Indeed, notice that if a positive measure of …rms do not follow the social planner's production plan, the wage, given by (20), is distorted and so is the decision of …rms with y ( ) = 0.
For relatively "dirty"…rms, we obtain the following characterization. Dirtier …rms reduce emissions by the same amount; i.e., the di¤erence between ex-ante and ex-post emissions is the same. Dirtier …rms have higher ex-post emissions, but ex-post emissions decline as permits become more expensive to acquire. The production of dirtier …rms declines in the wage, their degree of dirtiness, , and in the price of permits. Interestingly, the higher the price of permits, the lower the wage. If permits are more costly to acquire, more …rms decide to spend resources to reduce their ex-ante emissions. Those …rms who still emit ex-post also reduce their production scale. Therefore, they do not employ as much labor as when the price of permits is low. As a result, the wage has to fall.
The equilibrium price level is, of course, a function of the policy on permit issue, T . As expected, if there is a high volume of permits in circulation, they will have no market value. Firms receive a transfer of permits, T , in each period, and they are not forced to carry permits from one period to the next. One way to achieve the e¢ cient level of production, q ( ), is to set M and T such that M = T = R y ( ) dG ( ) = E , so that the stock of permits is just su¢ cient to cover the e¢ cient amount of emissions, E . In this case, the unique equilibrium price, ; is = 1=u 0 (c ), and m + = 0, as + < . Thus, there is no banking of permits. In a stationary economy, where the distribution of emissions is the same in each period, this implies that the stock of permits should be set at E . This discussion is summarized in the following.
The equilibrium with permits is e¢ cient if M = T = E for all t. The banking of permits is not necessary for e¢ ciency.
We …rst guess that m + = 0 and show that this is the only outcome consistent with equilibrium. Denote by y ( ; ), the choice of emissions by a …rm with shock , given that the price of permits is . Using m + = 0 in the market clearing condition for permits, we obtain that M = R y ( ; ) dG ( ). We have shown that y ( ; ) is a decreasing function of , for all . Thus, y ( ; )
Hence, the only equilibrium is when = 0 and q ( ) = q. (19) then implies that + = 0, thus, m + = 0.
(b) Using the fact that ( ) = 0, for all , the …rm's …rst order condition can be re-arranged as
Setting M = E , equilibrium implies that y = y ( ), q = q ( ), and satis…es u 0 (c ) = 1. Indeed, given this , we can de…ne 0 ( ) = 0 , where 0 is the multiplier in (10) . Then the …rm's FOC and the planner's FOC coincide. Therefore, M = E implements the e¢ cient allocation. 9 Next, we investigate the implications of taxing emissions. Here we assume that, while the government does not observe , ex post emissions, y ( ), are veri…able, so the government can impose a tax, , on emissions once production takes place. For simplicity, we assume the tax schedule is history-independent, so that t (yjh t ) = t+1 (yjh t+1 ), where h t is the history of emissions up to and including date t 1. The tax proceeds are then distributed to consumers as a lump-sum transfer. At the start of a period, a …rm which received shock solves the following:
The …rst order conditions are
The planner's …rst order conditions are
It is then easy to see that the tax schedule (e) = e u 0 (c ) implements the e¢ cient allocation. Thus, taxes can be an e¤ective way to implement the …rst-best.
So far we have assumed that there is no aggregate risk. As a result, the optimal levels of production and emissions are known. However, our results generalize to the case where the function G is random. In that case, c will be a function of G, which is not observable. Yet, both cap and trade and a state-contingent tax can support the e¢ cient levels of output and emissions in our economy.
To illustrate, consider the case where emissions are drawn from a new distribution G 1 instead of the initial distribution G 0 , where
In words, …rms are on average cleaner and, as a result, E decreases, from E 0 to E 1 < E 0 . Clearly, a tax system which does not depend on any aggregate variable will not achieve the …rst best. Let us, however, consider a tax system that is measurable with respect to the wage level, w, which is observable at the time of production. Then a …rm emitting y has to pay tax (e; w). Given G i , let c i be the planner's solution for consumption, and let w i be such that w i u 0 (c i ) = 1. De…ne a (state-dependent) tax schedule, (e; w), as follows:
The same analysis as before can be used to show that this tax schedule implements the …rst-best. We now turn to cap-and-trade. Under the initial distribution G 0 , e¢ cient emissions are given by E 0 , and, as we have shown, e¢ ciency results under permit supply M 0 = E 0 and equilibrium price 0 . Now suppose the distribution changes to G 1 . If nothing else changes, the new resulting permit price will decline, signaling to the authority that G has changed to G 1 , in which case the e¢ cient emissions are given by E 1 . It can be shown that E 1 can be supported under permit supply M 1 = E 1 , with a resulting equilibrium price 1 , where 1 < 0 .
In summary, both taxes and emission trading can support the e¢ cient allocation under aggregate risk. This conclusion relies on considering state-contingent taxes. In the case of cap and trade, the market price for permits acts as a signalling device. It declines when …rms are on average cleaner. However, without a change in the supply of permits, total emissions will diverge from their e¢ cient level. This calls for an authority that can adjust the stock of permits in order to support the new e¢ cient level of emissions. Our analysis suggests that the supply of permits should be a policy variable for this authority, much like the supply in the money market is controlled by a central bank.
Endogenous Technological Change
Our analysis so far has abstracted from issues related to technological change. These issues are of …rst-order importance, and our main focus is the study of the relative merits of taxes versus cap and trade if the possibility of endogenous technological change is introduced. 10 In this section we extend our basic model to account for this possibility.
Like before, we identify …rms by their type, , indicating their tendency to pollute. Here we assume that types, which remain private information, are distributed at t = 0 according to a cumulative distribution G with support [0; ]. As in the previous section, a -…rm emits q units of pollution whenever it uses q units of labor. In this section, we assume that …rms can hire labor in order to invent/adopt new, cleaner technologies. To capture the fact that returns to R&D involve an element of randomness, we assume that a -…rm can devote units of labor in order to enter a "lottery." In that case, in the next period, it will receive the new emission factor~ = 0 with probability s while, with probability 1 s, its emission factor remains the same as before (~ = ). In words, with probability s a …rm becomes clean forever and with probability 1 s it remains as dirty as before. Other than this feature, the model remains the same as in the previous section. 11 We will consider the simplest case, where G ( ) has a two-point support, f0; g, with G (0) = denoting the mass of clean …rms. 12 The distribution of …rms in every period is summarized by the mass of clean …rms, which greatly simpli…es the analysis. As in the previous section, our e¢ ciency benchmark will be the full-information …rst-best. This involves choosing non-negative consumption, c, production, q ( ), and a choice of R&D investment, i ( ) 2 [0; 1], for each …rm. Clearly, the e¢ cient allocation would involve no investment in a new technology for clean …rms, so we let i 2 [0; 1] be the mass of dirty …rms entering the lottery. Given that a …rms needs to use units of labor to enter the lottery, the consumers'utility is reduced by the amount of labor devoted to research and development (1 ) i. 13 We denote by V the social planner's objective function, given the initial distribution of clean …rms, . To reduce notation, in what follows we use i = i , q = q (0), q = q , while + = + (1 ) si denotes the measure of clean …rms 10 See Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, and Hemous (2012) for a discussion of these issues in connection to the environment and growth. 11 Note that if a …rm becomes clean, it remains clean forever. This speci…cation will result in a non-stationary equilibrium fraction of clean …rms. 12 Normalizing the lowest state to = 0 is only for simplicity and the results generalize to any …nite support. Analyzing the case of a continuous support poses technical di¢ culties and is beyond the scope of this paper. 13 We assume that R&D itself is not a polluting activity.
in the next period. The e¢ cient allocation is the solution to the following problem.
Given the linearity of the objective in i, we can obtain an explicit form for V ( ). Notice …rst that the solution for c, q, and q does not depend on i. Replacing the market clearing condition in the planner's objective and taking the …rst order conditions with respect to q and q, we obtain
Given , de…ne the solution by q ( ) and q ( ). Plugging these values in the market clearing condition determines c ( ). Thus, the planner's problem becomes
where
As the solution to (29) and (30) is unique, there is a single value of such that F ( ) = v, for each value of the instantaneous surplus v. Also, F is di¤erentiable with
and . We now guess that the value function takes the form
To verify, using (33) the planner's problem becomes
The …rst order condition gives
Using this policy function in the objective function, we obtain
which veri…es our guess. Notice that is a constant in [0; 1]. From (35),
Hence, as the measure of clean …rms increases, the planner reduces investment in clean technology R&D. Clearly, there is a such that for all , the planner chooses i ( ) = 0. The threshold level, , is de…ned by = , or
If there is no emissions control, …rms maximize their pro…ts without concern about emissions, and their production decision follows (2) . No …rm invests in emissions reduction, as the investment in R&D is costly. Since …rms' production decision is independent of their shock, overall emissions (the emissions from dirty …rms) are given by E = (1 ) q, where q is the equilibrium level of production. Taking E as given, consumers maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint and their behavior is again summarized by the …rst order condition (4). Market clearing is given by (5) and the equilibrium level of production q satis…es (6); i.e., f 0 (q) u 0 (f (q)) = 1. Welfare in this economy is given by
We discuss two forms of policy next.
Emissions Trading
We …rst consider a cap and trade system. A dirty …rm producing q and receiving emission factor , will need to accumulate q permits in that period. The permits are then remitted once production takes place. As before, …rms can also invest in order to reduce their emissions. There is a market where …rms can trade permits. We assume that ex post emissions, y = q, are observable, while and i( ) are private information. 14 The price of permits in terms of the numeraire is again denoted by . The sequence of events is as follows:
As before, we denote the total stock of permits in this economy by M , while a …rm's individual permit holdings are denoted by m. We denote the value of a dirty …rm entering the market with m permits and shock by V (m), and the value of a corresponding clean …rm by V 0 (m). Hence, V (m) for 2 f0; g is de…ned by 
where T y + is the (ex-post emissions-dependent) transfer of permits by the issuing authority. When a …rm enters the market for permits, the value of its portfolio is m. The …rm then has to remit q permits (of value q) and decides how many permits to carry over to the next period, m + . The …rst order conditions for an interior condition i( ) 2 (0; 1) are
and the envelope condition gives V 0 (m) = , for 2 f0; g. The …rst order condition for i(0) clearly implies that i(0) = 0, as clean …rms remain clean. The last two conditions imply that, in an equilibrium with banking, the price of permits must satisfy
The consumer's …rst order conditions give
Finally, market clearing implies
and the law of motion for clean …rms is + = + si( )(1 ). Next, we determine whether the e¢ cient allocation is implementable. We divide the analysis into three cases. First we discuss the policies which implement the e¢ cient allocation when and when < , but close to . Finally, we consider the case where is far below .
(i) Case when 15 To economize on notation, we suppress the dependence on in what follows.
First, note that the equilibrium outcome in an economy with banking but without transfers is ine¢ cient for all . Indeed, in this case the e¢ cient allocation is such that q( ) satis…es wf 0 ( q) = 1 + , where w = u 0 (c) 1 . But this can only be the case if = w. Therefore, > + = , which contradicts e¢ ciency. The only other way to reach the e¢ cient allocation when is through the use of a transfer policy T y t 0. With , a transfer policy is optimal only if (29) and (30) 
Thus, T y t = T y , a constant, and market clearing requires T y = q. Hence, dirty …rms should not conduct R&D whenever , and the transfer should implement i( ) = 0. That is,
Using the market clearing condition in the market for permits, we obtain that i( ) = 0 if
Since and F 00 < 0, this condition is satis…ed since f (q 0 ) wq (ii) Case when < but close to In this case, the e¢ cient allocation has some dirty …rms investing in R&D. Therefore, it must be that (41) holds with equality, or, 
or, using the solution for q 0 for clean …rms,
We need to check whether we can obtain (51) using this formulation. Let q be the solution to the dirty …rm's problem given wage w. Then
Using this expression into (51), we obtain that i( ) 2 (0; 1) i¤
(55) where we have used that + = w + , as this is a necessary condition for e¢ ciency. Using 
Since + = w + , the consumers'…rst order condition gives u 0 (c) = w( ) 1 . Thus,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that is close to . In this case, the e¢ cient allocation implies that investment in R&D decreases (so that can be close to + ) in order to satisfy the above inequality. In that case, m 0 + = m + = 0, so that (58) gives
Market clearing requires that
Therefore,
Notice that if + is close enough to (which will be the case when i( ) is su¢ ciently close to zero), then T 0 ( ) > 0, so that the optimal policy is to grant some permits to clean …rms. As T y ( ) is not su¢ cient for dirty …rms to pledge the required permits, they will have to purchase the missing permits from clean …rms, thus, e¤ectively subsidizing them. This subsidy makes being "clean" more attractive and incentivizes investment in R&D. Note that this is in addition to having to give up revenue from permits. This additional incentive is necessary since e¢ ciency requires that w = .
(iii) Case when is far lower than Finally, we consider the case where is far lower than , so that u 0 (c( + ))=u 0 (c( )) < . Emissions trading cannot implement the e¢ cient allocation in this case. Indeed, optimality requires that w( ) = ( ) and w( )u 0 (c( )) = 1. But this would imply that ( ) < ( + ). This is not consistent with an equilibrium, as it implies an excess demand of permits by …rms who will want to resell them in the next period. It is useful to provide some intuition for this result. E¢ ciency requires that aggregate i increases fast. To induce this increase, the future price of permits must be su¢ ciently high. However, this creates an incentive for …rms to purchase permits now, in order to sell them in the future, when the price will be higher. This is inconsistent with equilibrium, as it creates an excess demand for permits.
In summary, when the measure of dirty …rms is greater than a critical threshold, the e¢ cient allocation is not implementable via the use of an emissions trading system. Equilibrium under emissions trading either makes technology adoption by dirty …rms too slow, or it distorts production by dirty …rms relative to the …rst best. Below we show that …scal policies do not su¤er from this drawback. As in the case without endogenous technology change, a tax scheme can always implement the …rst best.
Taxes
We denote the value of a dirty …rm by V , and the value for a clean …rm by V 0 . Hence, for 2 f0; g, V is de…ned by
Clearly, optimality requires that
so that the optimal tax is linear in the quantity of emissions; i.e., ( qj ) = w( ) q + x ( ), for some x ( ). To induce investment, the tax must be such that (66) holds with equality whenever i > 0. Using this and q 0 (the optimal choice of clean …rms), we can rewrite V ( ) as
Using this expression back in (66), we obtain that i 2 (0; 1) i¤
Comparing this last expression with (35), we obtain that the tax policy can implement i i¤
or, using the consumers'…rst order condition, i¤
In particular, if x 0 = 0, then x ( ) < 0 and dirty …rms should receive a corresponding lump-sum subsidy. We summarize our main …nding in the following.
Proposition 2 A tax scheme is less constrained in achieving the optimum than emissions trading. Equilibrium under emissions trading imposes the additional condition that = w, which reduces the range of feasible policies. As a result, emissions trading fails to attain the …rst best when the measure of dirty …rms is greater than a critical threshold.
Our overall message is as follows. In monetary models, certain conditions need to be satis…ed in order for money to have value in equilibrium. Modeling explicitly the money-like feature of permits in an intertemporal model implies that a set of related requirements must be satis…ed in order for permits to have value. We showed that these requirements are likely to be binding in the case where there is endogenous progress in clean technologies and when the initial fraction of "dirty" …rms is large. On the other hand, tax policies do not need to satisfy these additional requirements.
Conclusion
Our work is motivated by the observation that emission-trading resembles monetary trade. We used insights from dynamic mechanism design in monetary economics to derive properties of optimal dynamic emissions trading mechanisms. More generally, we argued that policy-makers should think about permit-issue in a manner similar to that used by central bankers, and we discussed optimal permit-issue policy. At the optimum, the price of permits increases over time. Our main …nding is that when there is endogenous technological progress in clean technologies, and if the measure of dirty …rms is large, the e¢ cient allocation is not implementable via the use of an emissions trading system. Equilibrium under emissions trading either makes technology adoption by dirty …rms too slow, or it distorts production of dirty …rms relative to the …rst best. We showed that …scal policies do not su¤er from this drawback.
Our model can be extended in several directions. First, while we studied conditions under which the …rst-best is implementable, we have not characterized the constrained-e¢ cient allocations in the cases when the …rst-best cannot be supported. As we mentioned already, it would also be interesting to extend the analysis to accommodate serially correlated shocks. Finally, we could study generalizations of the assumed functional forms. As we argued earlier, we made these assumptions mainly for tractability, and we believe our results to be robust under various generalizations of the model. Lemma 3 (a) y ( ) < q ( ), for all such that q ( ) > 0; (b) Assume f 00 (q) q=f 0 (q) 1, for all q. Then @y ( ) =@ > 0 and there is a~ > 0 such that y ( ) = 0 for all <~ . In addition, q ( ) y ( ) is constant for all ~ .
Proof: (a) Suppose that > 0, for some . Then y ( ) = q ( ). As a consequence, 0 = 0, and (10) implies 1 = < 0, which is a contradiction.
(b) Since ( ) = 0, the …rst order conditions are
First, consider the set of 's for which 0 = 0. Then, y ( ) 2 (0; q), and the …rst order conditions are
Given c , (74) implies that q ( ) is decreasing with . Also (75) implies that
so that y ( ) is increasing in if f 00 q f 0
1.
16 Therefore, there is~ such that given c , 0 = 0 and
In turn,~ solves
where (x) = f 0 1 (x). For all >~ , the solution is given by (74) and (75). Also, if <~ , it cannot be the case that 0 = 0. Thus, y ( ) = 0, for all <~ . Notice that q ( ) y ( ) is constant in whenever y ( ) > 0; i.e., the reduction in emissions is the same for all …rms. Finally, it remains to show that~ > 0. By contradiction suppose that~ = 0. Notice that for any q ( ) and y ( ) satisfying (74) and (75), it must be the case that q ( ) < q (0) and q ( ) ! 0, as ! 0. Therefore, h 0 ( q ( ) y ( )) ! 0, as ! 0. Thus, for any c and " > 0, there is > 0 such that h 0 ( q ( ) y ( )) = " and "u 0 (c ) < 1. This contradicts that y ( ) > 0, implying that~ > 0.
Lemma 4
The e¢ cient allocation is such that~ 1 >~ 0 . For all >~ 1 , q 1 ( ) < q 0 ( ) and y 1 ( ) < y 0 ( ).
Proof: From (74) and (75), given a level of aggregate consumption, c , the value of q ( ), is decreasing in whenever y ( ) > 0. Since there is a larger fraction of clean …rms in the economy under G 1 (while the mass of …rms is the same), we infer that c 1 > c 0 . In this case, (74) implies that f 0 (q 1 ) u 0 (c 1 ) = f 0 (q 0 ) u 0 (c 0 ) whenever y 1 ; y 0 > 0. Therefore, q 1 ( ) < q 0 ( ); i.e., …rms with the same produce relatively less in the cleaner economy. Finally, from (75),
Thus, …rms with the same reduce their emissions by a larger factor in the cleaner economy. Next, we demonstrate that~ 1 >~ 0 . First, notice that, for any c, q ( ) is increasing in if f 00 q f 0 . This implies that, given c, (
) is increasing in , where (x) = f 0 1 (x). Second, since 0 (x) < 0 and u 0 (c 1 ) < u 0 (c 0 ), we must have that (
), for any . However, (79) implies that~ 1 (
) is increasing in , this implies that 1 >~ 0 . Thus, more …rms are ex-post clean in the economy under G 1 .
Lemma 5 (a) y ( ) < q, for all , whenever > 0. (b) Suppose > 0. Then there is ( ) > 0 such that for all ( ), we have that y ( ) = 0. The quantity produced, q ( ; w), is decreasing in and in w. In addition, 0 ( ) > 0.
Proof: (a) y ( ) < q, for all , implies that ( ) = 0. Indeed, suppose there is a such that ( ) > 0 and y ( ) = q. Then 0 ( ) = 0 and, since h 0 (0) = 0, (16) gives
which is impossible when > 0.
(b) Consider the case of a …rm with y ( ) = 0, for some . In this case, 0 ( ) > ( ) = 0 and the …rm's solution is
The expression f 0 (q) h 0 ( q) is strictly decreasing in q, so that (81) de…nes a function q ( ) that is uniquely de…ned for each . It is easy to check that q 0 ( ) < 0. In addition, q ( ) is decreasing in w, for all such that y ( ) = 0. Finally, notice that h 0 ( q) is increasing in . Taking the total 22 derivative, and using the expression for q 0 ( ) from (81), we obtain
where the inequality follows from the concavity of the production function. Thus, there is a such that y ( ) = 0, for all < . The threshold is de…ned by
Whenever ( ) = 0, the emissions constraint is not binding, and, from (81), q ( ) is not an explicit function of . Therefore, when increases, must also increase by (83). Thus, more …rms choose to reduce their emissions to a full extent when the price of permits increases.
Lemma 6 (a) Suppose > 0. Then, for all > ( ), we have that y ( ; ) and q ( ; ; w) are such that 0 < y < q, q y is a constant function of . (b) w 0 ( ) < 0.
Proof: (a) Let us consider the case when 0 < y ( ) < q. Setting ( ) = 0 ( ) = 0, the solution of the …rm's problem becomes,
Replacing the expression for h 0 in the …rst equation, we obtain
For …rms with > , the solution is a pair (q ( ) ; y ( )) that solves these equations. Notice that q 0 ( ) < 0 whenever > 0. Also, y 0 ( ) > 0, if f 00 (q) q=f 0 (q) 1. Finally, if increases then q ( ) declines, in which case y ( ) is also decreasing in .
(b) Given …rms'optimal behavior, w is given by
17 From (81), we have f 00 2 h 00 q 0 ( ) = qh 00 :
Therefore, < 0. When studying the general equilibrium e¤ect of a rise in , it is important to notice that the e¤ect on q ( ) is somewhat tempered by the decline in w. Still, q ( ) and y ( ) remain decreasing as functions of .
An Extension: Futures Market
In the emissions trading system studied in the body of the paper we assumed that the issuing authority assigns permits to …rms at the start of a new remittance period. In this section, we show how our model can be extended to the case where the government sells permits rather than transferring them lump-sum and free of charge. 18 Assume that …rms receive signal s = + " on the realization of their shock, , at the start of the market. The random term " is drawn from a distribution F and E (" i ) = 0, for all i. Given this structure, the …rm's signal is also a …rm's best guess for the true value of . Once s is observed, a …rm can access a futures market to acquire or sell permits at a price p, for delivery at the remittance date. At this stage, the government sells an amount T of permits (buys if T < 0).
Then the true shock is realized and …rms decide on their production and emission levels. At the remittance date, a spot market for permits opens, where …rms can trade their permits at a price . Finally, each …rm presents an amount of permits equal to the amount of emissions, y.
We denote the value of entering the futures market with m permits and shock s by V (m; s) and the value of entering the spot market for permits with m permits and shock value s by W (m; ). 
The stock of permits follows the law of motion
Given a policy fT t g, an equilibrium is a list of quantities and emissions fc t ; q t ( ) ; y t ( )g, permittrading decisions fx t ( ) ; m t ( )g, and prices fp t ; t g, such that, given prices, the list of decision variables solves the …rms'and consumers'problems and markets clear. An equilibrium is stationary whenever the list of quantities and emissions is time independent; i.e., when fc t ; q t ( ) ; y t ( )g = fc; q ( ) ; y ( )g, for all t.
We demonstrate that for any stationary policy T , there is a unique stationary equilibrium. We …rst solve the …rm's problem. The …rst order conditions give 
The workers'decision is still given by (4) and, using market clearing, we obtain an expression for the wage
From (99), it is clear that either (s) > 0, for all s, and p > , or (s) = 0, for all s, and p = .
If p > , then all …rms sell their permits, so that T = M < 0. In addition, (95) implies that R y ( ; s) + m + = 0. Since y ( ; s) 0 and m + 0, this implies that y ( ; s) = 0, for all s, . Clearly this is not e¢ cient. The only candidate e¢ cient equilibrium is one where (s) = 0, for all s, so that p = . This is equivalent to an equilibrium where the issuing authority would buy or sell permits in the spot market during the remittance period. Given p = , the equilibrium is as in the text, and we can set x (s) = T and y ( ; s) = y ( ; s 0 ), for all (s; s 0 ), since …rms are indi¤erent between holding permits across the two markets.
